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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 990987-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(Supp. 1998). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion 
to suppress alleging that the police officer's search violated defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Standard of Review. "The factual findings underlying a trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous 
standard, and the legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion 
1 
given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, is determinative of the appeal. The 
Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const., amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 02. A warrant was issued for defendant's arrest when he failed to appear 
for the preliminary hearing. R. 12-13. A week later, defendant was arrested and booked into 
jail. R. 16. After holding a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over for trial 
on both counts. R. 20. Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained by 
police from a search of his vehicle. R. 23-24. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion. R. 51, 63-69, 84. 
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Pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), defendant entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a controlled substance and the 
misdemeanor charge was dismissed. R. 52, 55-62; R. 85: 5, 15-16. In entering his plea, 
defendant reserved his right to appeal the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress. R. 55, 
58;R. 85:16. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-
five years, but suspended imposition of the prison term and placed defendant on supervised 
probation. R. 70-72; R. 86: 9-10. Defendant timely appealed. R. 74. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
While on patrol in the late evening of December 11,1998, Officer Bruce Huntington 
observed defendant driving southbound on Holden Street in Midvale. R. 84: 7-8 
(suppression hearing transcript). Officer Huntington initiated a computer check of 
defendant's license plate with the database for the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles 
(DMV). R. 84: 7,10. While Officer Huntington waited for the computer check, defendant 
turned left (east) onto Main Street. R. 84: 7-8. However, rather than turning into the inside 
or extreme left-hand eastbound lane of Main Street as required under section 41-6-66, Utah 
Code Annotated, defendant turned into the far outside eastbound lane. R. 84: 7-10. After 
Officer Huntington observed the illegal turn, the computer check revealed that defendant's 
car was not insured. R. 84: 7,10. 
Officer Huntington activated his overhead emergency lights to initiate a traffic stop. 
R. 84: 7, 11. Defendant pulled into the parking lot of a convenience store and Officer 
Huntington parked behind defendant. R. 84: 7,11,14. Upon approaching defendant's car, 
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Officer Huntington observed defendant in the driver's seat and another male in the front 
passenger seat. R. 84:12. Officer Huntington advised defendant of the purpose of the stop 
and defendant admitted that he had no insurance. R. 84:12-13. After obtaining defendant's 
driver's license and registration, Officer Huntington returned to his patrol car to check on the 
status of his license and for any outstanding warrants. R. 84: 13, 29. After approximately 
five minutes, the computer check revealed a valid driver's license and no outstanding 
warrants. R. 84: 13. After receiving the information from the computer check, Officer 
Huntington promptly returned to defendant's car. R. 84:13-14. At that point, another officer 
pulled into the parking lot and parked along side Officer Huntington. R. 84: 14-15. The 
second officer exited his car and walked to the passenger door of Officer Huntington's car 
where he remained while Officer Huntington spoke with defendant. R. 84: 15-16. 
Upon returning to defendant's car, Officer Huntington instructed defendant to obtain 
insurance and to have his insurance agent notify DMV. R. 84: 16-17, 35, 43-44. After so 
warning defendant, Officer Huntington returned defendant's license and registration. R. 84: 
16-17,29. Although defendant was then free to leave, Officer Huntington asked defendant 
if he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the car. R. 84:17-18. After defendant indicated 
that he did not, Officer Huntington asked for and obtained defendant's consent to search the 
car. R. 84: 17-18. In seeking consent to search, Officer Huntington used a normal tone of 
voice and did not make any promises or threats. R. 84: 18. Althougli Officer Huntington 
was armed with a firearm, he did not pull it out during the stop or search. R. 84: 19. 
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After defendant gave his consent to search, he and his passenger exited the car. R. 84: 
18-19. When defendant opened the door, Officer Huntington observed a "billy club" on the 
floorboard between the door and driver's seat. R. 84: 20, 41. Officer Huntington then did 
a brief search of defendant's person for weapons and found none. R. 84:23,41. At Officer 
Huntington's request, defendant walked to the patrol car where the second officer was 
standing while Officer Huntington conducted the search. R. 84: 19-20. A search of 
defendant's car revealed a marijuana pipe, smelling of marijuana, on the floorboard in the 
driver's area. R. 84: 20-21. When questioned about the marijuana pipe, defendant told 
Officer Huntington that it belonged to him. R. 84:20-21. Not more 15 minutes had elapsed 
from the time Officer Huntington activated his emergency lights to the time he found the 
billy club on the floorboard. R. 84:23. Officer Huntington then took defendant into custody, 
advising him that he was under arrest and placing him in handcuffs. R. 84: 22. Officer 
Huntington searched defendant incident to his arrest and found methamphetamine in his 
pocket. R. 56; R. 84: 22; R. 85: 10-11.1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should no longer rely on the language in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 
883 (10th Cir. 1977), as the analytical framework for determining whether a consent to 
search is voluntary. The requirements articulated in Abbott applied to the broader issue of 
whether a search was valid pursuant to an alleged consent. Abbott thus intertwined the 
Officer Huntington testified that he found a controlled substance on defendant's 
person in a search incident to arrest. R. 84: 22. Defendant admitted at the plea hearing 
that the substance was methamphetamine. R. 56; R. 85:10-11. 
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requirements for finding consent with the requirements for finding voluntariness. The 
intertwining of those requirements is of no consequence in the Tenth Circuit because it 
reviews for clear error both the trial court's finding of consent and the trial court's finding 
of voluntariness. However, under Utah law, those requirements must be clearly 
distinguished because of the appellate court's bifurcated review in consent cases. The trial 
court's finding that defendant consented to the search of his car is reviewed by this Court for 
clear error. The trial court's determination that the consent was voluntary is reviewed for 
correctness. Moreover, the Abbott presumption against a finding of voluntariness has since 
been rejected by the Tenth Circuit and is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent. 
In this case, the trial court's finding that defendant consented to Officer Huntington's request 
to search the car was not clearly erroneous, but was supported by the unequivocal testimony 
of Officer Huntington. Moreover, because the evidence demonstrated that the officer did not 
coerce defendant into consenting, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's consent 
was voluntary. 
Nor was defendant's consent the result of a prior illegality. The detention of 
defendant terminated after Officer Huntington warned defendant to obtain insurance and 
returned to defendant his license and registration. Defendant voluntarily chose to respond 
to the officer's questioning after the detention terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
On appeal, defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the methamphetamine discovered in the search. Aplt. Brf. at 11. Defendant argues 
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that the warrantless search of his car violated his Fourth Amendment right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, contending that police did not obtain a valid consent to 
search the vehicle and that, in any event, the consent was tainted by the prior illegal 
detention. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-17, 19-27. Contrary to defendant's claim, however, the 
evidence was more than sufficient to establish defendant's voluntary consent to search his 
car. Moreover, because the questions posed by Officer Huntington were made after 
defendant was free to leave, they did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
* * * 
"Searches conducted 'outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,687 
(Utah 1990) {quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967)). 
"[0]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and 
probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct. 2041,2043-44 (1973). Accord State v. Bredehoft, 
966 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah App. 1998). 
Evidence seized in a consent search will be admissible in court if: (1) the consent was 
voluntary, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. In this case, defendant's consent was voluntary and was not 
obtained as the result of a prior illegality. 
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I. THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER 
THE CONSENT EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT AND PROBABLE 
CAUSE REQUIREMENT. 
A. Legal Analysis of Consent Searches. 
On appeal, defendant argues that this Court's decision in State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 
(Utah App. 1996), establishes the analytical framework for determining whether the consent 
was voluntary. Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Ham relies on language from the 1977 Tenth Circuit 
decision in United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1977), for the standard by which 
voluntariness of a consent is analyzed. Quoting Abbott, the Court in Ham held that the 
following three requirements must be met to establish that voluntary consent was given: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently' given; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, [ ]] the courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived." 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (quoting Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885) (other citations omitted). Ham is 
the most recent of a series of decisions by this Court which applies the Abbott standard to 
voluntariness determinations. See, e.g., State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 
1994); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah App. 1993), ajfd, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 
1996); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460,467 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 
136 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 127 (Utah App. 1991); State v. 
Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
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App. 1990). The Utah Supreme Court, however, has never adopted the Abbott standard in 
assessing the voluntariness of a consent.2 
A close examination of the Abbott decision itself, in light of both federal and state 
law, suggests that the Court should no longer rely on the Abbott standard in analyzing the 
voluntariness of a consent search. Continued reliance on the Abbott standard is problematic 
for two reasons. First, the third Abbott requirement creating a presumption against waiver 
has since been rejected by the Tenth Circuit and is contrary to United States Supreme Court 
precedent. Second, the remaining two requirements co-mingle the issue of whether consent 
was in fact given with the issue of whether any consent given was voluntary. This co-
mingling of the issues is significant because unlike the Tenth Circuit, Utah appellate courts 
review the trial court's determination of voluntariness for correctness. 
1. No Presumption Exists Against a Voluntary Consent 
The third prong of the Abbott standard as adopted in Ham and other appellate 
decisions of this Court is that the court must "indulge every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. Four years later, however, the United 
States Supreme Court in Schneckloth held that "unlike those constitutional guarantees that 
protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be 
2Although the Utah Court of Appeals applied the Abbott standard in Harmon, 854 
P.2d at 1040, in affirming that decision, the Utah Supreme Court did not adopt that 
standard. See State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1206-08 (Utah 1996). Instead, the Utah 
Supreme Court focused solely on whether the consent was "the product of duress and 
coercion." Id. at 1206. 
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indulged against voluntary relinquishment" of the right against searches. 412 U.S. at 242-43, 
93 S.Ct. at 2056 (emphasis added). Citing Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit abandoned the 
third Abbott requirement in 1991, holding that "a district court determining the admissibility 
of evidence should not presume a defendant's consent to a search is either involuntary or 
voluntary." United States v. Price,925F.2d 1268,1271 (lOthCir. 1991) (citing Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 242-43,93 S.Ct. at 2055-56); accord United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 
1500 (10th Cir. 1996). 
Given the Supreme Court's holding that such a presumption should not be given and 
the Tenth Circuit's subsequent abandonment of the presumption, this Court is constrained 
to now abandon that requirement as well. 
2. The Factual Determination of Whether a Consent is 
Unequivocal and Specific Is Distinct from the Legal 
Determination of Whether a Consent is Voluntary. 
The Tenth Circuit's concern in Abbott was not confined to the voluntariness of the 
consent, but included the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that consent was given at 
all. As such, in setting forth the standard for determining whether the search was justified 
under the consent exception, the Tenth Circuit intermingled the requirements for finding the 
existence of a consent to search with the requirements for finding that any consent given was 
voluntary. 
Voluntary consent presupposes consent. The Abbott requirement that consent be 
"unequivocal and specific" simply requires the State to establish the existence and scope of 
the consent. Once consent is demonstrated, the State must establish that the consent was 
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voluntary—that it was given freely, without duress or coercion. Whether consent was in fact 
given, and the scope of that consent, are underlying factual issues separate from the legal 
issue of voluntariness. Accordingly, when determining whether a defendant actually 
consented to a particular search, this Court will not upset the trial court's factual findings in 
that regard unless they are clearly erroneous. Ham, 910 P.2d at 438. Once those factual 
issues are addressed, the Court may then turn to the legal determination of whether the 
consent given was voluntary. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
The Abbott Standard. In Abbott, the defendant was placed in jail and his car was 
impounded following his arrest for illegal automobile registration and possession of a 
weapon. Abbott, 546 F.2d at 884. After Abbott's arrest, his wife went to the impound garage 
seeking release of the car. Id. At the garage, she and an officer unsuccessfully searched the 
car's passenger compartment for the title to the car. Id. Because she did not have a trunk 
key, she was unable to look in the trunk of the car for the title, and returned home to look for 
the key. Id. After she left, an officer located a key in the lining of Abbott's coat pocket. Id. 
Although Abbott's wife had not returned, the officer nevertheless opened the trunk where he 
discovered a .30 caliber carbine which became the subject of Abbott's prosecution. Id. The 
trial court denied Abbott's motion to suppress the evidence, finding that Abbott's wife 
implicitly consented to the officer's search of the trunk. Id. at 884. 
In reversing the trial court, the Tenth Circuit held that the aforementioned 
requirements were necessary to "sustain the burden required of the government to establish 
justification for a warrantless search" pursuant to a consent. Id. at 885. The court did not 
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characterize the standard solely in terms of assessing the voluntariness of a consent—though 
voluntariness was certainly a key component. The Abbott test required the government to 
first establish that the consent was actually given to search the defendant' trunk, and second, 
to establish that any consent given was voluntary. 
In articulating the standard by which consent searches are judged, the Tenth Circuit 
inAbbott cited to Villano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962). Abbott, 546 ¥.2d 
at 885. As in Abbott, the court in Villano addressed the broader question of whether evidence 
seized in a warrantless search was constitutionally admissible pursuant to an alleged consent. 
Villano, 310 F.2d at 684. Villano summarized the government's burden as follows: 
The government must prove that consent was given. It must show that there 
was no duress or coercion, express or implied. The consent must be 
unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given. There must be 
convincing evidence that defendant has waived his rights. There must be clear 
and positive testimony. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against 
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Coercion is implicit in situations 
where consent is obtained under color of the badge, and the government must 
show that there was no coercion in fact. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although the Villano articulation of the 
standard is only slightly better, its clarity greatly increases when broken up as follows: 
The government must prove that consent was given. It must show that 
there was no duress or coercion, express or implied. [In other words,] [t]he 
consent must be unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given. 
There must be convincing evidence that defendant has waived his rights. 
There must be clear and positive testimony. Courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Coercion is 
implicit in situations where consent is obtained under color of the badge, and 
the government must show that there was no coercion in fact. 
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Id. Organized in this manner, it is apparent that the certainty and specificity of the consent 
have nothing to do with the voluntariness of the consent, but are prerequisites to any 
consideration of voluntariness. The revised construction also reveals that the court required 
that the testimony of waiver be clear and positive. As discussed above, however, the Tenth 
Circuit no longer indulges in a presumption against waiver. 
In summary, the appropriate standard by which consent searches should be judged is 
best articulated as follows: 
Evidence seized in a search is admissible under the consent exception to 
the warrant requirement only if the State meets a two-part test. First, the 
State must "prove that consent was given." f/#7/a#f0,31OF.2dat684. The 
consent must be 'unequivocal and specific." Abbott, 546 F.2d at 885. 
Second, the State must establish that the consent was voluntary. In other 
words, the State must "prove consent was given without duress or 
coercion, express or implied." Id. 
The two-part inquiry is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent. In 
Schneckloth, the Supreme Court observed that Fourth Amendment concerns with respect to 
voluntariness of a consent to search are similar to due process concerns with respect to 
voluntariness of a confession. 412 U.S. at 225-27, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. Explaining the 
concerns in the context of a confession, the High Court noted: 
The Due Process Clause does not mandate that the police forgo all 
questioning, or that they be given carte blanche to extract what they can from 
a suspect. "The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly 
established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of 
voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may 
be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity 
for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due 
process." 
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412 U.S. at 225-26, 93 S.Ct. at 2047 {quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 
81 S.Ct. 1860,1879 (19-)) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court concluded that no reason 
existed "to depart in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition of 
'voluntariness."' Id. at 229,93 S.Ct. at 2049. As such, the Court observed, "the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments [simply] require that a consent [to search] not be coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force" Id. at 228, 93 S.Ct. at 2048 
(emphasis added). Thus, "if under all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was 
not given voluntarily-that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission 
to a claim of lawful authority—then [the Court will find] the consent invalid and the search 
unreasonable." Id. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2051. 
Abbott's requirement that the consent be freely given and made "without duress or 
coercion, express or implied," is consistent with the holding in Schneckloth. Abbott's 
requirement that the consent be "unequivocal and specific" goes to the underlying factual 
issues of whether any consent was in fact given, and if so, the scope of that consent. In short, 
the certainty and specificity of the consent have nothing to do with the voluntariness of the 
consent, and Abbott did not suggest otherwise.3 
Subsequent Tenth Circuit decisions have included the certainty and specificity 
requirement in the test for voluntariness. See, e.g., United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 
1557 (10th Cir. 1993). However, as discussed below, the intertwining of requirements 
that the State establish unequivocal and specific consent with requirements that the State 
demonstrate the consent was given freely without duress or coercion is of no consequence 
in the Tenth Circuit. 
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Bifurcated Standard of Appellate Review, The co-mingling of the inquires 
regarding the existence and scope of consent with the inquiry regarding voluntariness of 
consent is significant because Utah appellate courts apply a different standard of review to 
voluntariness determinations than that applied by the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit 
reviews the trial court's determination that a consent to search was voluntary or involuntary 
under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d 1225, 
1231 (10th Cir. 1998). Utah appellate courts, on the other hand, review the trial court's 
determination regarding the voluntariness of a consent under a correctness standard. 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. This distinction is critical when applying the Abbott standard 
to inquiries regarding the voluntariness of a consent. 
In the Tenth Circuit, the trial court's determinations regarding the fact of consent, the 
scope of consent, and the voluntariness of consent are all findings of fact reviewed for clear 
error. See Gutierrez-Hermosillo, 142 F.3d at 1231. Accordingly, any intertwining in the 
Abbott standard of requirements for finding the existence and scope of consent with 
requirements for finding the voluntariness of consent is of no consequence. 
In Utah, however, the consequences of such intertwining is critical. While the 
determination regarding the voluntariness of consent is reviewed for correctness, the 
underlying factual issues, including "whether a defendant actually consented to a search," 
are reviewed for clear error. Ham, 910 P.2d at 438. Blending factual issues like the 
existence and scope of consent into the question of voluntariness can lead to absurd 
results—as it did in Ham. 
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In that case, the Court observed that both agents "testified that defendant did in fact 
consent to the search." Id. The Court noted that the defendant's testimony was not 
substantially inconsistent with that of the agents, testifying "that he 'simply complied' with 
the agent's request [to search] and did not 'offer any resistance or. . . voice any objection."9 
Id. at 438 & n. 7. However, the Court then held that the trial court was entitled to discredit 
the defendant's testimony and concluded that the finding of consent was not clearly 
erroneous. Id. at 438. However, in finding that the consent was involuntary, the Court 
continued its focus on the trial court's finding of consent. Id. at 439-40. After examining 
the testimony, the Court determined that the evidence showed that the agents "themselves 
[were] not sure whether defendant gave any type of consent at all." Id. at 440. The Court 
then concluded that their testimony was "not 'clear and positive' testimony [of unequivocal 
and specific consent] which is necessary to meet the State's burden." Id. Thus, on the one 
hand, the Court found the evidence sufficient to support a finding of consent, and on the 
other hand, it found the evidence insufficient to support a finding of consent. 
As discussed above, whether or not consent is unequivocal and specific does not 
address the constitutional concern of voluntariness, but the underlying factual issues of 
whether consent was in fact given, and if so, its scope. Accordingly, the Court in Ham 
should have limited its review of those issues to the clearly erroneous standard, deciding 
whether or not it was clear error for the trial court to find consent based on the agents' 
equivocal testimony. 
16 
The Court's conclusion that the consent was not voluntary was best supported by its 
observation that the agents never made a genuine request for consent to search, but instead 
stated that they 6"need[ed] to search the refrigerator for alcohol/" Id. at 440. The Court 
concluded the statement constituted "a claim of authority to search by the agents, supporting 
the existence of coercion or duress." Id. Such is the proper concern of the court when 
examining the nature of a consent to search under the Fourth Amendment. See Schneckloth, 
412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2051. 
Reviewing for clear error a trial court's determination regarding the existence or scope 
of a consent to search is also consistent with the underlying rationale for such review. In 
Thurman, the Utah Supreme Court held that a correctness standard should be applied to the 
voluntariness determination because "the concept of 'voluntariness' reflects a balance 
between the need for effective law enforcement and society's belief that the coercive powers 
of law enforcement must not be unfairly exercised." 846 P.2d at 1271. The Court reasoned 
that in striking that balance, the appellate courts are in the best position to establish norms 
based on substantive policy fixing the limits of acceptable police behavior. Id. In this way, 
it will be less likely that "what constitutes unfairly coercive police behavior [will] not vary 
from courtroom to courtroom in Utah." Id. 
On the other hand, the determinations of whether consent was given and the scope of 
consent do not involve any competing policy interests which must be balanced. They are 
fact-sensitive issues only and the trial judge is in the best position to make those fact 
determinations. See id. at 1271. As once observed by this Court, "[b]ecause 'the truth is 
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rarely pure and never simple,' the trial judge is in the best position to sift witness credibility 
and the accuracy of conflicting evidence." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 
1991). Indeed, the trial judge was in the best position to determine whether defendant 
actually consented to the search and the scope of that consent—determining what the 
defendant intended by his language or by his actions. 
B. The Trial Court's Finding That Defendant Consented to the 
Officer's Request to Search His Car Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
Defendant challenges the following findings of fact by the trial court: 
27. [After asking defendant whether he had any drugs, weapons, or 
paraphernalia in the car,]4 Officer Huntington then asked defendant whether 
he could search his car. 
28. The officer's question was permissive and did not suggest that he 
had a right to search. 
29. Defendant clearly and unequivocally said "yes," permitting the 
search. 
R. 66; Aplt. Brf. at 14. Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, those findings are supported 
by the record and are not, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
1. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Finding 
that Officer Huntington Asked for Consent to Search the Car. 
Defendant's challenge to paragraph 27, in which the court found that Officer 
Huntington asked defendant whether he could search the car, is frivolous. Officer 
Huntington testified that after returning to defendant his driver's license and registration, he 
4Although the trial court found that the officer asked if he had any drugs, weapons, 
or paraphernalia in the car, the officer testified that he asked if he had "any alcohol, 
weapons or drugs" in the car. R. 84: 17. 
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"asked him for consent to search the vehicle." R. 84: 16. In explaining the nature of his 
warning for no insurance, Officer Huntington again testified that he "asked [defendant] for 
consent." R. 84: 17. He further testified that after asking whether or not a driver has any 
alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the vehicle, it was his practice to ask the driver if he "mind[ed] 
if[he]check[ed]?" R. 84:17. He responded in the affirmative when the prosecutor queried 
whether he asked defendant if he minded if he checked the car. R. 84: 18. Officer 
Huntington confirmed at least two more times that he asked for consent to search defendant's 
car. R. 84:18 (explaining the tone of voice he used in asking if he could check the car), 38-
39 (affirming on cross-examination that he asked defendant if he could search the car). No 
evidence was introduced indicating that Officer Huntington did not seek consent to search. 
The evidence, therefore, was more than sufficient to support the trial court's finding in 
paragraph 27. 
2. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Finding 
That Officer Huntington's Request to Search the Car Was 
Permissive and Did Not Otherwise Suggest That He Had a 
Right to Search. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding in paragraph 28 that the officer's 
request to search the car "was permissive and did not suggest that he had a right to search." 
R. 66; Aplt. Brf. at 15. Again, defendant's claim lacks merit. Nothing in the officer's 
questioning suggested that he had a right to search or that defendant was required to consent. 
Officer Huntington used the same tone of voice as he used in court. R. 84:18. He made no 
threats or promises. R. 84: 18. Nothing in a question asking defendant if he would consent 
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to a search or if he minded if the officer checked for drugs, alcohol, or weapons suggests that 
defendant was required to consent. Accordingly, the trial court's finding in paragraph 28 is 
also supported by the record. 
3. The Evidence Is Sufficient to Sustain the Court's Finding That 
Defendant Consented to the Search. 
Finally, defendant claims that the record did not support the trial court's finding in 
paragraph 29 that "[defendant clearly and unequivocally said 'yes,' permitting the search." 
R. 66; Aplt. Brf. at 14-15. Again, however, contrary to defendant's contention, the record 
does not support defendant's claim. The following exchange took place during the State's 
direct examination of Officer Huntington: 
Prosecutor And when you asked him for consent, do you recall now 
exactly how you phrased that? 
Officer It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you 
have any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if 
they say no, I say, Well, do you mind if I check? 
Prosecutor Do you recall Mr. Hansen responding to your question? 
Officer He did give me consent. 
Prosecutor Well first, with respect to the question as to whether he had 
those items in his car. 
Officer No. He said no. 
Prosecutor He said no. 
The Court And the query again, Officer, was, Do you have any— 
Officer Alcohol, drugs or weapons. 
Prosecutor To which Mr. Hansen said no? 
Officer That's correct. 
Prosecutor And then you asked, ["]Do you mind if I check?["] 
Officer Uh-huh. 
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Prosecutor And what was his response to that question? 
Officer He said yes. 
Prosecutor Yes, he minded? 
Officer Yes, I could have consent to search. 
R. 84: 17-18 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Officer Huntington twice verified that 
defendant consented to the search. He testified that when he asked if he could search the car, 
defendant "did give me consent." R. 84: 17. Although Officer Huntington subsequently 
appeared to testify that defendant gave a contradictory response when asked if defendant 
minded if he searched the car, Officer Huntington clarified that defendant responded, "Yes, 
I could have consent to search." R. 84: 18. 
On cross-examination, Officer Huntington again confirmed that defendant consented 
to the search: 
Def Counsel So [after defendant said he did not have drugs, alcohol, or 
weapons in the car,] you then indicated that you asked him 
if you could search the vehicle? 
Officer I did. 
Def Counsel Do you recall specifically what you said to him? 
Officer Not specifically. 
Def Counsel Do you have any idea? 
Officer I would imagine I stated: Do you have any alcohol, drugs 
or weapons in the vehicle? 
Def. Counsel He said no? 
Officer He said no. Do you mind if I check? 
Def. Counsel Okay. 
Officer And then he said yes. 
The Court He said? 
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Def. Counsel He says yes. 
Officer Yes. 
The Court Do you mind if I check and he said yes? 
Officer Well, do you mind if I check, and then yes, he gave me 
consent. Sorry. 
Def. Counsel So you said he gave you consent? 
Officer Yes, he did give me consent. 
Def. Counsel What did he say? 
* * * 
Officer I don't recall exactly other than it was consent. 
Def Counsel So you don't recall his exact words? 
Officer Not exactly. 
Def Counsel So you are assuming that he said yes? 
Officer I assume that he said yes. 
Def Counsel That's what you're doing today . . . in terms of his 
response? 
* * * 
Officer I assume that he said yes. 
Def Counsel Nothing more than that? 
Officer He probably could have said yes, go ahead. 
Def Counsel But you don't recall him saying that? 
Officer I don't recall. 
R. 84: 38-40 (emphasis added). Officer Huntington's testimony provided more than 
sufficient basis for the court's finding that defendant "clearly and unequivocally said 4yes,' 
permitting the search." R. 66. Common experience teaches that questions beginning with 
the words, "do you mind," are often answered in the affirmative even though the intent is to 
indicate that the speaker does not mind. The trial court is in the best position to assess the 
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meaning of defendant's response to Officer Huntington's inquiry. As he did on direct, 
Officer Huntington twice testified that defendant consented to the search. All that defense 
counsel established on cross-examination was that Officer Huntington did not recall 
"specifically" how he asked for consent and that he did not recall defendant's "exact" words. 
When asked on re-direct examination whether he "just [didn't] recall what the exact words 
were," Officer Huntington testified that he did not. R. 84:43. Otherwise, Officer Huntington 
was undaunted in his testimony that defendant consented. Although Officer Huntington 
testified that he "assumed" defendant said yes, his assumption was to the wording only, not 
the consent. Thus, when defense counsel asked if the officer assumed nothing more than that 
defendant said yes, Officer Huntington testified that defendant "probably could have said 
yes, go ahead." R. 84:40. 
Officer Huntington's testimony is not like that of the agents in Ham as defendant 
suggests. In Ham, the agents "themselves were not sure whether defendant gave any type 
of consent at all." 910 P.2d at 440. After one agent testified that defendant did not respond 
to the other agent's announcement that he was going to search the refrigerator, he 
subsequently testified that defendant "might have" said "Go ahead." Id. The other agent was 
equally unsure, testifying that he "believe[dj" there was a response. Id. Although Officer 
Huntington did not recall the specific wording of the conversation, his testimony was clear 
and positive that defendant consented to the search. He did not waiver in that regard.5 
5Given the clear and positive testimony from Officer Huntington, even if the Court 
continued to apply the less deferential Abbott standard, the court's finding of consent was 
correct. 
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In sum, Officer Huntington testified four times that defendant consented to his request 
to search the car. Although he did not recall the exact wording of the conversation, Officer 
Huntington was unequivocal in his testimony that consent was granted. Moreover, nothing 
in the questioning posed by Officer Huntington suggested that he had a right to search or that 
defendant was required to consent. As such, the trial court's challenged findings were not 
clearly erroneous. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Defendant's Consent 
Was Voluntary. 
As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth held that a 
consent is constitutionally invalid and the search unreasonable "if under all the circumstances 
it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily—that it was coerced by threats or 
force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority." 412 U.S. at 233, 93 
S.Ct. at 2051. The Utah Supreme Court has identified the following factors which may show 
the consent was voluntary, and not the product of duress or coercion: "1) the absence of a 
claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer." State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 
106 (Utah 1980). 
A review of those factors in this case supports the trial court's conclusion that the 
consent was in fact voluntary. Officer Huntington claimed no right to search, but simply 
asked for consent to search. R. 84: 16-18. There was no evidence that the officer used 
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deception or trickery to obtain consent, making neither promises nor threats. R. 84:18. Nor 
did Officer Huntington pull out or otherwise display his weapon. R. 84: 19. Although 
another officer had arrived at the scene, he remained standing next to Officer Huntington's 
patrol car, never approaching defendant. R. 84: 14-16. Officer Huntington used the same 
tone of voice as he did in the courtroom at the suppression hearing. R. 84: 18. Moreover, 
defendant was cooperative during the entire encounter. R. 84: 46. All these facts 
demonstrate that the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary 
and nothing in the record suggests otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
determined that the consent was voluntary. 
II. Defendant's Consent to Search His Car Was Not Obtained by Police 
Exploitation of a Prior Illegality. 
Having resolved that defendant's consent was voluntary, the Court must determine 
whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 688. Defendant claims that although Officer Huntington had completed the purpose 
of the stop, he impermissibly extended the detention by asking defendant whether he had any 
drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the car and requesting consent to search. Aplt. Brf. at 20. 
When Officer Huntington asked these questions, however, the detention had already 
terminated. 
Traffic stops constitute a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396 (1979); accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127, 1131 (Utah 1994); State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 648-49 (Utah App. 1998). 
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However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and seizures, but only those 
that are unreasonable. State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah App. 1992). The 
reasonableness of a traffic stop, like any other seizure, "is judged by balancing its intrusion 
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate 
government interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 (footnote omitted). 
Because "a traffic stop is limited and is more like an investigative detention than a 
custodial arrest," it must satisfy the two-part test established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). Parker, 834 P.2d at 594 (citations 
omitted); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. First, the stop must be "'justified at its 
inception.'" Lopez, 873 P.2dat 1131-32 {quotingTerry, 392 U.S. at 19-20,88 S.Ct. at 1879). 
Second, the resulting detention must be "'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first place.'" Id. {quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879). "[0]nce the reasons for the initial stop of the vehicle have been completed, 
the occupants must be allowed to proceed on their way." State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 
158 (Utah App. 1992). "Further questioning is permissible only if(l) the encounter between 
.the officer and the driver ceases to be a detention, but becomes consensual, and the driver 
voluntarily consents to additional questioning, or (2) during the traffic stop the officer gains 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal activity." United States 
v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429-30 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
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A traffic stop is justified at its inception if it is "incident to a traffic violation committed 
in the officers] presence." State v. TalboU 792 P.2d 489,491 (Utah App. 1990); accord 
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132. "Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the officer has 
'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as 
driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license . . . [or that] the driver is 
engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs.999 Id. {quotingState v. 
Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah App. 1992)). 
Defendant concedes that Officer Huntington was justified in making the stop. Aplt. Brf. 
at 20. Officer Huntington observed defendant make an improper left-hand turn and received 
information from his computer check that the car was not insured. R. 84: 7, 10. 
Accordingly, the first part of the Terry test is not at issue. 
"Once a [valid] traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.999 Id. {quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)). This Court has acknowledged that "[w]hen 
making a routine traffic stop, an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.99 O'Brien, 959 P.2d at 649 
(citing Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132). So too may an officer run a warrants check during the 
course of a routine traffic stop, "so long as it does not significantly extend the period of 
detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a driver's license and valid registration 
and to issue a citation.99 Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1133. 
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In this case, Officer Huntington notified defendant of the purpose of the stop, obtained 
defendant's registration and license, ran a computer check for warrants and to verify 
licensing and registration information, promptly returned to defendant's car after running the 
computer check, warned defendant to get insurance, and gave back to defendant his driver's 
license and registration—all within a period of less than ten minutes. R. 66; R. 84: 13-14, 
16-17, 29, 35, 43-44. As the above-mentioned cases make clear, Officer Huntington's 
actions were reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the stop and defendant has not 
argued otherwise. See Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. 
The trial court concluded that the return of defendant's documentation signaled the end 
of the detention—that "defendant was clearly free to leave" at that point. R. 66 (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, ^ 23). Defendant contends, however, that his detention 
continued beyond the return of his driver's license. Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. The trial court's 
conclusion is "reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial 
judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247. 
The courts have recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement and the public: (1) consensual encounters in which the person is 
free to leave, (2) brief investigatory stops based on articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime, and (3) arrests based on probable cause. Salt Lake 
City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 55, J 10, 998 P.2d 274 (citing State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617-18 (Utah 1997) (per curiam)). The issue here, therefore, is whether Officer Huntington's 
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return of the driver's license and registration converted the level-two detention of defendant 
into a level-one consensual encounter. 
The Tenth Circuit has held that "'after an officer issues the citation and returns any 
materials provided, the driver is illegally detained only if the driver has objectively 
reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave.'" United States v. Anderson, 
114F.3d 1059,1064 (10th Cir. 1997) {quoting UnitedStatesv. Shareef, 100F.3d 1491,1501 
(10th Cir. 1996)). The same rationale applies in the case of a warning. Once an officer gives 
a warning and returns any documentation provided by the driver, the driver is illegally 
detained only if the driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not 
free to leave.'" Id. {quoting Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1501); see also State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 
765,767 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that the appropriate inquiry in determining whether or 
not a person has been seized is whether a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, 
would believe he or she was free to leave). Defendant has shown no such cause. 
A level-two detention converts to a level-one, consensual encounter if, "either from the 
words of [the] officer or from the clear import of the circumstances," a reasonable person 
would believe he or she is free to leave. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242,1244 (Utah 1994). 
Factors that suggest a detention exists, or in the converse, that a detention has not ended, 
include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, 
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice 
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." United States v. 
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MendenhalU 446 U.S. 544, 554,100 S.Ct. 1870,1877 (1980); accord State v. Patefield, 927 
P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996); Anderson, 114 F.3d at 1059. 
In this case, Officer Huntington had verbally warned defendant to obtain insurance and 
notify DMV. R.84:16-17,35,43-44. He had also returned to defendant his driver's license 
and registration documents. R. 84: 16-17, 29. Defendant was not surrounded by officers. 
R. 67 (Findings, % 67). Although a second officer arrived after Officer Huntington had 
walked back to defendant's car, that officer simply parked along side Officer Huntington's 
car and waited for him there. R. 84: 14-15. He never approached defendant or his car, but 
stood next to the passenger door of Officer Huntington's patrol car. R. 84:15-16. The third 
officer did not arrive at the scene until after defendant consented to a search. R. 84: 18-19. 
Although Officer Huntington was armed, he did not pull out his gun or otherwise display the 
weapon. R. 84: 19. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that he physically touched 
defendant or used any means of coercion. See R. 67 (Findings, If 32); R. 84:18-19. In short, 
Officer Huntington's verbal warning that defendant needed to obtain insurance and his return 
of defendant's registration and driver's license signaled the end of the detention such that a 
reasonable person would feel free to leave. 
Defendant focuses on the fact that Officer Huntington did not expressly state how he 
would resolve the improper left-hand turn and that he did not use the word "warning." Aplt. 
Brf. at 23-24 & n. 5. The Fourth Amendment does not require particular language, or words 
at all, to signal the end of a detention. See Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244. Indeed, any 
requirement that an officer expressly state that he is only issuing a warning or that he is not 
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going to cite the offender would be contrary to the reasoning of the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,117 S.Ct. 417 (1996). In that case, the High 
Court expressly rejected as unrealistic any requirement that police officers "always inform 
detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary.9' Id. 
at 39-40, 117 S.Ct. at 421. 
Accordingly, Officer Huntington was not required to expressly inform defendant that 
he was issuing a verbal warning or that he was not citing defendant. The clear import of his 
action in warning defendant to obtain insurance and in returning the documents was that 
defendant was free to leave. Contrary to defendant's claim, Officer Huntington's question 
as to whether defendant had any drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the car, and his follow-up 
request for permission to search the car—which could not have taken more than a few 
seconds—did not extend the level two detention. Officers are free to pose questions to the 
public and a citizen's decision to answer the question does not escalate the encounter into a 
level two detention. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765,768 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that 
a seizure did not occur by virtue of the officer's request for identification), cert, denied, 815 
P.2d241 (Utah 1991). 
In Patefield, an officer stopped a driver for a burnt out license plate bulb. 927 P.2d at 
656. After the officer gave the driver a verbal warning to repair the broken light, the 
defendant offered to fix it. Id. at 656-57. The officer remained at the location, assisting the 
driver by holding a flashlight. Id. at 656. When the driver opened the sliding door of his van 
to retrieve a toolbox, the officer observed several open containers of beer in the van. Id. A 
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subsequent search of the van revealed marijuana. Id. at 657. This Court identified the issue 
as "whether, when viewed from an objective standard, someone in [the driver's] position 
would reasonably have felt free to leave after [the officer] gave the equipment failure 
warning." Id. at 659. Although no testimony was given indicating whether or not the 
defendant's driver's license was returned or that the defendant was free to leave, the Court 
nevertheless concluded that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Id. at 656, 
659. In so concluding, the Court observed that nothing in the facts suggested that the officer 
compelled the driver to repair the light. Id. at 659.6 Indeed, as the Court noted, "[t]he record 
[was] void of any evidence suggesting that [the officer] 6use[d]... language or [a] tone of 
voice' demonstrating that [the driver] was compelled to fix the light on the spot." Id. at 660 
(quoting MendenhalU 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877) (all but first bracket in original). 
Likewise in this case, nothing in the facts suggests that Officer Huntington used 
language or a tone of voice demonstrating that defendant was compelled to respond to his 
question or consent to a search. Officer Huntington used a normal tone of voice and did not 
make any threats or promises. R. 84: 18. As explained above, no show of force was made 
and the only other officer on the scene remained standing at Officer Huntington's patrol car. 
R. 84:14-16,18-19. As such, the exchange was a consensual encounter in which defendant 
voluntarily chose to participate. The two brief questions did not extend the detention. The 
6The defendant in Patefield had conceded that the officer "meant only to issue a 
verbal warning." 927 P.2d at 659. 
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stop had ceased and defendant voluntarily consented to the questioning. Therefore, the 
evidence seized pursuant to the consent search was not tainted by a prior illegality. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted this W day of June, 2000. 
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